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INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY
Mr. PAUL McGEAD P
Thank you, Gary. Today we are going to talk about the
Communications Decency Act of 1996,10 generally referred to as
9. Paul J. McGeady serves as General Counsel for Morality in Media,
Inc., which is the leading Anti-Pornography Organization in the United States,
as well as Director of the organization's National Obscenity Law Center. He
has prepared model legislation for states and municipalities. He was
instrumental in preparing the language of the present Texas Obscenity Statute,
the Texas Child Pornography Statute, and the New York Obscenity Statute.
Mr. McGeady has authored the Obscenity-RICO Federal statute, has served on
various civic boards and organizations, and is the Editor of the Obscenity Law
Bulletin and the recently published Obscenity Law Reporter. In addition, he
participated as Amicus Counsel in the case of Reno v. ACLU, and he has
testified before the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography at the
request of the Commission.
"0 Communications Decency Act of 1996. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)-(h)) (amending the Communications Act of 1934, § 223(a)(1)(B),
(a)(2), (d)(1), (d)(1-2)). The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or
"the Act"), which constitutes Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
was signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996. The
Communications Act of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1)(B) Whoever, by means of a telecommunications device
knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates the transmission
of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated
the communication.
(a)(2) Whoever, knowingly permits any telecommunications facility
under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph
(1) with the intent that it be used for such activity.
(d)(1) Whoever, in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or uses any interactive computer
service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of
age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of
such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
1997
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the "CDA." I think it is important to discuss what the act covers.
I will give an abbreviation of the various things that it has to say.
First, it prohibits the transmittal by a telecommunications
device, for instance, a modem, of an obscene" or indecent
comment or image with the intent to annoy or harass." Secondly,
it prohibits the transmittal by a telecommunication device of an
obscene or indecent comment or image, if it is known that the
recipient is under eighteen years of age. 3 Thirdly, it prohibits
the knowing use of an interactive computer service' to send any
communications that, in context, depicts or describes in terms
patently offensive, as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs to a specific
person under eighteen years of age. 5 All three prohibitions will
clearly be upheld, however, the third prohibition is in dispute.
The third prohibition is causing the Supreme Court difficulty.
On March 19, 1997, the Supreme Court"6 heard the appeal from
the three-judge District Court in Philadelphia. 7 The arguments
were presented and the courtroom was overcrowded with
lawyers. Various constitutional objections were articulated. One
objection involved overbreadth and whether this type of law
which prevented adults from communicating indecently was
overbroad."8 The theory is that indecent communication between
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
" Obscene is defined "as objectionable or offensive to accepted standards
of decency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (6th ed. 1990).
12 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(1)(A).
'3 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(1)(B).
Russell Shaw, Technology; Cable Mulls Legal Issues for Internet,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Mar. 11, 1996, at 38 (stating that legal experts "'define
interactive computer service to mean any information service system or
softvare provider that provides or enables computer access.'").
15 47 U.S.C. § 223 (d)(1).
16 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1996).
'" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd.,117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
'" Id. at 859. The overbreadth doctrine "serves to invalidate legislation so
sweeping that along with its allowable proscriptions, it also restricts
[Vol 14
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adults is protected speech.' 9  However, that theory is not
necessarily set in concrete. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, " the
indecency law was upheld.2' One of the rationales for upholding
the indecency law was that the audience consisted of unconsenting
adults, as well as, children." As far as we are concerned the
overbreadth is not a problem because we have two affirmative
defenses that can be utilized. These defenses will enable adults to
obtain this material.
A defense is available if the person who is posting the
indecency, which is distinguished from obscenity, makes a good
faith, reasonable effort under the circumstances to restrict access
by minors. "3 Indecency is distinguished from obscenity because
constitutionally protected rights of free speech, press, or assembly. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (6th ed. 1990).
19 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(explaining indecent, but not obscene, sexual impression is protected by the
First Amendment, however, the content of the constitutionally protected
speech may be regulated in order to promote a compelling interest by utilizing
the least restrictive means to further the interest).
0 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The case involved
an afternoon radio broadcast of comedy monologue by George Carlin, which
contained profanity. Id. at 729-30. A father complained about the broadcast
after he and his young son overheard it in the car. Id. The Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") found the broadcast indecent in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976 ed.). Id. at 732. Section 1464 (1976 ed.)
provides:
Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication which forbids the use of "any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.
Id.
21 Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748.
Id. at 748-49. The Pacifica opinion ruled on the "unique" attributes of
broadcasting noting that broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive," it can intrude on
the privacy of the home without warning as to the program context, and is
"uniquely accessible too children, even those to young to read." Id.
147 U.S.C. 223 (e)(5). The Act affords a "safe harbor" defense which
provides in pertinent part: "(A) Online providers have a defense if they have
taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors ... which may involve
1997
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obscenity is banned.24 A second defense is available if the person
who is posting the indecency has restricted access by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code or
adult identification.25 We believe that a combination of these
aforementioned defenses will permit adults to freely talk
indecently to each other.
An additional objection made involved anonymity. In order to
utilize these defenses you must identify yourself in some way.
Our answer to that is, so what? Identification is necessary when
using dial-a-porn. 2 In order to obtain dial-a-porn, you have to
use your credit card or a personal identification number. Under
these circumstances, we do not think anonymity raises itself to a
constitutional dimension. Dial-a-porn laws have been blessed by
the courts. In Sable Communications of California v. FCC,2"
any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications . . .
Id.
24 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Supreme
Court sustained the validity of a federal obscenity statute that prohibited
sending obscene material through the mail. For the first time, the Court held
that obscenity is afforded no constitutional protection. Id. at 485.
" 47 U.S.C. 223 (e)(5)(B). The Act affords a "safe harbor" defense if the
online provider has restricted access to such communication by requiring use
of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number. Id.
26 Elizabeth J. Mann, Comment, Telephones, Sex and the First
Amendment, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1221 (1986). "Dial-a-porn is the colloquial
name given to telephone services that offer sexually explicit recorded messages
to anyone with access to a telephone." Id.
27 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
The Supreme Court struck down legislation outlawing dial-a-porn laws
(telephone indecency). Id. at 131. The Court explained that the dial-a-porn
service is a medium where callers have to take active and affirmative steps in
order to access the phone sex services. Id.
28 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Sable Communications is a company in
California that offers sexually oriented pre-recorded telephone messages,
known as "dial-a-porn." Id. at 117-18. In Sable, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of § 223 (b) of the Communications Act, as
amended, which banned indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone
messages. Id. at 117. The Court held that although the ban on obscene
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the Supreme Court suggested that Congress go back to the
drawing board. The Court stressed that Congress should require
credit cards, codes, and scrambling devices on dial-a-porn to
separate children from adults. 29 Two Circuit Court opinions, one
in the Second Circuit" and one in the Ninth Circuit3' have said
that the dial-a-porn defense and the dial-a-porn law is valid. We
find there is not much of a distinction between the two.
Vagueness r was another objection that was raised. It is not a
big deal. A justice in the Philadelphia court said, "I don't find
any vagueness."3 Vagueness is associated with the second prong
of the Miller test which has been blessed by the Supreme Court. '
In Dial Information Services Corporation of New York v.
29 1d. at 128-30.
o Information Services Corporation of New York v. Thornburgh, 938
F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the "central blocking approach"
involved placing a 3 digit prefix to the phone numbers of sexually explicit
telephone- services, telephone subscribers could request that the telephone
company block access to sexually explicit telephone services).
31 Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that FCC regulations required an individual to notify the carrier in
writing in order to receive "dial-a-porn" messages).
32 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1976) (striking
down a vagrancy statute on the grounds that it was vague and encouraged
arbitrary enforcement).
1 Reno, 929 F. Supp at 867. Judge Dalzell did "not believe the statute
was unconstitutionally vague." Id.
33 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court vacated
a conviction for mailing unsolicited advertisements containing sexually explicit
material that was not obscene. Id. at 37. It articulated the standards by which
obscene material could be identified. The Court set forth the basic guidelines:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable sta:e law;
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,




McGeady and Godwin: Internet Pornography
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAWREVIEW
Thomburgh35 and Information Providers' Coalition v. F.C.C.,36
the Circuit Courts stated that there is nothing vague about the
patently offensive definition.37
Mr. Godwin has indicated that the Supreme Court may or may
not apply strict scrutiny to this type of speech.38 Furthermore,
Mr. Godwin says that it is possible that the Court will decide that
every medium has its own law. The Supreme Court,
theoretically, could say well, we've got to get a new answer to
this, this is a problem that cries out for some type of solution. So
we are not sure if strict scrutiny would apply. Instead, the Court
may apply intermediate scrutiny.3 9
We filed a brief in the Supreme Court and in the lower court. 0
We took the position that this is a form of nuisance speech.4
Nuisance speech is a concept that comes from the FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation case. 2 In Pacifica Foundation, broadcasting
was held to be nuisance speech. 3 It had to be channeled in order
" 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991).
36 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
" Thornburgh, 938 F.2d at 1540; Information Provider's Coalition, 928
F.2d at 874.
38 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
Generally, the Supreme Court has applied a "strict scrutiny" standard to laws
regulating the content of speech, requiring that such laws be "narrowly
tailored" or that the "least restrictive means" be used to serve "compelling"
governmental interests. Id. at 126.
3 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting the
"intermediate scrutiny" standard to determine if the law "serves important
governmental objectives and if it is substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.").
40 Bob Peters & Paul McGeady, Amicus Brief. Reno v. ACLU, (visited Oct.
21, 1997) <http://dorothy.as.arizona.edu/law/CDA/brief3.txt>.
41 Id.
42 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. The FCC's decision was based on a nuisance
rationale where the "law speaks to channeling behavior ratl'er than actually
prohibiting it." The language of the comedy monologue was characterized as
"patently offensive" not obscene. Id.
43 Id. at 732. The Court reasoned that "we can regulate offensive speech to
the extent it constitutes a public nuisance .. .[t]he governing idea is that
'indecency' is not an inherent attribute of words themselves; it is rather a
matter of context and conduct . . . ." Id. The Court noted that "of all forms
[Vol 14
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to protect children and adults that did not consent." Our brief
concentrates on speech constituting nuisance speech."5 We start
out with the premise that the speech is not protected. Whether or
not the Supreme Court will pick up on that we do not know, but
you have the same two concepts and principles involved."6 You
have the protection of children and you have invasion of privacy
in the home, by dirty pictures and dirty messages that are readily
available to children. 7
Incidentally, when Mr. James Exon, Senator of Nebraska,
sponsored the Act, his office read the law to mean: whoever
transmits the message is the guilty party. Well, when you think
about it, who is doing the transmitting? You have a fifteen-year-
old at home working on a computer. He wants to access
something that he thinks would be interesting, so what does he
do? He pushes a few keys on the board and he transmits it. He
causes the information to come from the remote bulletin board
into his home. We pointed that out to Mr. Exon. The word
"available" was inserted into the revised bill.48 In addition, we
proposed defenses as a means of separating adults from children.
Moreover, I mentioned that the O'Brien test 9 would apply.
of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection." Id. at 742.
"Id.
4 Bob Peters & Paul McGeady, Amicus Brief. Reno v. ACLU, (visited Oct.
21, 1997) <httpl/dorothy.as.arizona.edulawiCDA/brief3txt>.
46 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
471id.
48 Communications Decency Act of 1995 Legislative Analysis, (visited
November 18, 1997) <http://www.ema.org/htm/at-work/s314.htm>.
Senator Exon's amendments, in pertinent part, would result in a new version
of 47 U.S.C. § 223 as follows: "Whoever . . . (1) by means of a
telecommunications device: (A). . .makes, transmits, or otherwise makes
available any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene, lewd, filthy, or indecent .... " Id.
"' United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test is a
three-prong test. The first prong asks whether the Act furthers important or
substantial government interests. Id. at 377. The second prong asks whether
the government's interests relate to suppressing free expression. Id. The third
prong considers whether the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than required to meet the government's interests. Id.
1997
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An objection was made, in that, the government failed to
identify the contemporary community standards 0 that would
apply to Cyberspace, under the Act. In other words, it has to be
"patently offensive" by contemporary community standards.
What standard will be utilized in court? Of course, the cyber
people suggest that the appropriate community for a community
standard analysis is the cyber-community itself. It seems that
could be the proper standard because it includes everybody in the
world. However, I do not think the Supreme Court will have a
problem in determining the standard.
In the situation we have today, a publisher may distribute a
magazine nationwide and worldwide.5' If he is arrested for
violating the Federal law pertaining to obscenity, the Federal
District Court will apply the local standard.2 The Supreme Court
has said we don't need a geographic standard.53 If the broadcast
law is violated, the standard for the broadcast medium will be
applied. Now, we don't know what standard will be applied, but
I predict the standard where the case is tried.
An additional objection raised was that some of these Internet
programs have "serious value."" "Serious value" is not part of
the test for indecency or for patently offensive speech. If it was,
you end up with the obscenity test and that is not what we have.
Therefore, "serious value" has no part in the determination, with
one exception. If it has "serious value," it probably is not
patently offensive;55 but nevertheless, it is not a defense. It only
goes into the mix to determine whether it is patently offensive.
'0 Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
5' See Shaw v. Reno, 930 F. Supp 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
52Id. at 935. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). In
Thomas, a California couple was criminally convicted for violating the
"community standards" of Memphis. Id. at 705-06.
.3 Miller, 413 U.S. at 31.
" Reno, 929 F. Supp at 854-55. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). "Serious value" pertains to the third prong of the Miller test which
states: (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. Id.
" Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (noting that formulating a test for sornething that is
patently offensive is virtually impossible).
[Vol 14
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One of the other problems raised at the Philadelphia court
level, not commented on by the Supreme Court at the hearing,
was the trans-border effect. 6  In other words, if you have
someone that has a porn bulletin board in Detroit, and the law is
passed and upheld, he or she will go across the border to Canada.
Absolutely nothing can be done about it. The problem is that the
same material will be coming into our home computers. I think
that it is a loophole in the law. I do not think it is a constitutional
loophole; it is just a practical loophole to accomplish the intended
purpose. I think the easy way to do that is to make the online
companies responsible, as facilitators of porn. To do that, we
have to go back to Congress and ask whether Congress would
adopt such a law. Certainly, that would plug up the loophole
because the question of facilitation of a crime is not new; it is just
that this law does not indicate it. Surely, that would be the way
to cure it.
From a practical standpoint, put yourself in the seat of the
Supreme Court. Say to yourself, I have heard these arguments,
what are we going to do about this? For example, would a
mother be held liable if she watches a child put this on and she
sees it, but she does not do anything about it? Technically, the
answer is yes but, practically the answer is no. How do you cure
that? Well, that can be cured by applying the concept. The law
is valid on its face but, invalid as applied to that situation. The
Court can also construe the law to eliminate these examples.
Anyhow, my prediction is that the Court will not strike down
this law in its entirety. When they get to the availability
question, making it available to minors, they will have difficulty.
If they have to come down with that rule, there is nothing that
you can do about it. In other words, porn will have to be
available to children. In my opinion, they are not going to do it.
If they stumble on that block, they can give Congress direction as
to how it can be cured.
56 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (citing U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701
(6th Cir. 1996) (affirming obscenity convictions stemming from the operation
of a computer bulletin board).
1997
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When I was at the Supreme Court hearing, I was asked to go to
Senator Coates' office. I can tell you, if a loophole is found in
this law, his office staff will eliminate it. Thank you.
Prof. SHAW:
Thank you, Paul. Now for the other side, Mike.
Mr. MICHAEL GODWIN:
I am going to get up to the podium because someone once told
me I think better on my feet. I tend to agree, since I am always a
little hazy about how I am thinking at any given moment.
Therefore, I thought I would stand up just for insurance.
I do not really view this as a debate, however I do think
differences exist between the philosophy toward the Constitution
and the issues in this case. What I would like to do as a kind of
temperamental debater is to just take this, instinctively of course,
as a point-by-point issue with respect to Mr. McGeady's
argument and have a point-by-point response. However, I do not
think that it is very instructive because it does not really give you
any philosophy. It is established that I can argue particular points
and I would like to argue some of them during a question and
answer session. More appropriately, I would like to talk about
some of the constitutional law principles that are present here. In
addition, I will discuss why I am personally interested in these
issues, which is not about defending pornography, although I
think some pornography is entirely defensible. Let me say at the
outset that I am a parent, and my little girl, who turned four
yesterday, is not yet a user of the Internet." I feel certain she
will be, given who her parents are, since we both met on the
Internet. I am far more worried about how laws like the
" Originally developed by the U.S. government to provide a means of
military communication in case of nuclear war, the Internet is a world wide
collection of computer servers linked together through an elaborate system of
computer hardware. Since the end of the Cold War, the Internet has become
accessible to the public. ALFRED & EMILY GLOSSBRENNER, MAKING MORE
MONEY ON THE INTERNET 5, 49-53 (1996).
[Vol 14
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Communications Decency Act58 will affect her than I am worried
about her encountering pornography on the Internet.
I think we have all heard the apocryphal story that I will
explain next. The story is about a mom who walked away from
her kid at the terminal for just a couple of minutes and came back
to see that pornography had flooded over the monitor, coming
from some malfeasant person. Just two minutes away from the
terminal is all it took. I always knew that story was fictitious
because I never could find anything in two minutes on the
58 Communications Decency Act of 1996. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)-(h)) (amending the Communications Act of 1934, § 223(a)(1)(B),
(a)(2), (d)(1), (d)(1-2)). The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or
"the Act"), which constitutes Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
was signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996. The
Communications Act of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1)(B) Whoever, by means of a telecommunications device
knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates the
transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the
communication. (a)(2) Whoever, knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for
any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it
be used for such activity. (d)(1) Whoever, in interstate or
foreign communications knowingly uses an interactive
computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or uses any interactive computer
service to display in a manner available to a person under 18
years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
1997 109
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Internet and I am pretty good at searching. Even if I tried to find
something offensive on the Internet, I do not think I could find it
in two minutes. For example, trying to find the Communications
Decency Act would take longer than two minutes.
As you may remember, there was a case called Cohen v.
California,59 for which Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion.
In Cohen, a gentleman walked into a California courthouse
during the Vietnam War with a jacket that had, "Fuck The Draft"
written on it. 60 Do you remember what the holding was in that
case? Well, it was considered to be political speech.6' Melville
Nimmer, 62 representing the appellant, argued the case before the
court and pointed out that the phrase was also intended to annoy. 63
Intention to annoy is constitutionally protected. 64 I think it is
recognized that part of the power of speech is to sometimes
express irritation toward people, hoping to annoy them. In fact,
when we address our speech to Congressmen, it is almost certain
that it is intended to annoy them. It seems clear that intentionally
annoying someone is part of freedom of speech because there is
no effort from society to ban or punish people who say nice
9 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that ". . . .absent a
more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not,
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple
public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal
offense."). Id. at 27.
60 Id. at 17.
61 Id. at 24. The court stated that:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.
Id.
6- Id. at 16. Melville Nimmer represented the appellant in Cohen.
63 Id. at 26.
64 Id. at 22-23 (rejecting the lower court's conclusion that where a particular
speech might invoke a violent response, the state has a right to censorship).
[Vol 14
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things. Mr. Rogers~s is not a felon, right? We do not worry
about Mr. Rogers getting scooped up in a dragnet for harassing
speakers. I think we all accept that some kinds of verbal
harassment, when raised to the level of threat or extortion, are
not protected speech and that is okay. In addition to threat or
extortion, I have no trouble with excluding blackmail, fraud or
perjury from the protected list. All the standard protections of
speech seem okay, and I do not take issue with those exceptions.
I believe what troubles me as well as Chief Circuit Judge
Sloviter, was explained in his opinion in ACLU v. Reno. The
judge gave some examples of speech that were understood to be
protected in the public square but would become illegal if said on-
line on the Internet.67
There is a real question as to why we should allow this type of
inconsistency. What is the philosophical justification for making
that distinction? For example, in the public square one does not
need to worry about people overhearing quite so much. I think
what is happening here has little to do with pornography despite
what we have been told about the Internet and the problem with
pornography. This is where I am going to part slightly from the
CDA discussion and ask: How many people here have heard a
story, seen news coverage or heard someone comment on the
availability of bombing information on the Internet in the last
year? One of the concerns about the Internet is that one can
' Mr. Rogers is a television host for a daytime children's show. Mister
Rogers Neighborhood [PBS] (visited Nov. 19, 1997)
<http://www.pbs.org/rogers/>.
1 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The court held that the
Communications Decency Act is facially unconstitutional. Id. at 884.
67 Id. at 854. The court stated that:
Other illustrations abound of non-obscene material likely to be
available on the Internet but subject to the CDA's criminal provisions.
Photographs appearing in National Geographic or a travel magazine
of the sculptures in India of couples copulating in numerous pc-sitions,
a written description of a brutal prison rape, or Francesco Clemente's
painting "Labyrinth," . . . all might be considered to 'depict or
describe, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.'
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apparently acquire information of all sorts that could be used for
good or for ill. That is the advantage or risk of having access to
information. One can use this information for bad purposes or
purposes that are disapproved by other people. This is also true
of public libraries, but we do not worry so much about regulating
bomb-making information in public libraries. Every public
library that I know contains information that could be used
destructively. The reason we do not worry about it is we don't
think people use libraries for the purposes of extracting socially
unacceptable information. Libraries, we suppose, are
depositories of unread information - - unlike the Internet. It is
known that there have been many incidents of terrorism based on
only the threat. We actually have the Federal Bureau of
Investigation talking about accessible information on the Internet,
but, at the same time there have been no terrorist incidents
associated with bomb-making information on the Internet
What is really happening here, of course, is not really about
terrorism on the Internet or even about pornography, although,
for Mr. McGeady and his group, it is about pornography. For
me, accessible information on the Internet means something else.
It means that for the first time in the history of our republic, the
full promise of the First Amendment" has suddenly come true.
As a consequence, freedom of speech69 or freedom of the press 0
suddenly is not a special interest constitutional amendment
anymore. The First Amendment is everyone's special interest
amendment.
A couple of weeks ago I appeared on a show that was taped by
the Hoover Institute. The host asked: "Why not impose these
restrictions on content providers?" I replied, "I don't think you
understand, you're the provider. We're all the provider."
61 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Freedom of Speech Clause provides in
pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . ... " Id.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 A content provider refers to an Internet Service Provider or ISP. An ISP
is an entity that allows home computer users access to the Internet. "Right
now, what you need to know is that anyone with a personal computer, a
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Despite what Mr. McGeady says with regard to what is banned
and what can be banned and so on, I have a different opinion of
the case law. I think the fact is that we tolerate a lot of offensive
speech in both our public and our private lives. In fact, the
Unites States is extremely solid in its tolerance of offensive
language. I mean, sometimes we allow people enormous latitude.
I have this viewpoint with respect to the Pacifica7 case. As we
were reminded, that case involved "seven filthy words" of a
George Carlin13 monologue. 74  The Pacifica radio station
broadcasted that monologue on the assumption that it underscored
freedom of speech in America. 7 Little did they know. In fact,
the regulation76 in question is grounded on a history of treating
broadcasting differently from other media. 7 The monologue that
telephone, and a ... modem can connect [to] the Internet .... Millions of
people .. . log on through independent Internet services providers (ISPs)
based in their towns and local calling areas." ALFRED & EMILY
GLOSSBRENNER, supra note 1, at 5 (1996).
2 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the
Federal Communications Commission prohibition of indecent language did not
constitute censorship under the Communications Act of 1934, that the
broadcasted language in the monologue could be considered indecent but not
be obscene, and that the Commission's order banning obscene language was
not a violation of the First Amendment.) "A radio station of respondent
Pacifica Foundation... made an afternoon broadcast of a satiric monologue,
entitled 'Filthy Words,' which listed and repeated a variety of colloquial uses
of 'words you couldn't say on the public airwaves.' A father who heard the
broadcast while driving with his young son complained to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).... ." Id. at 727.
1 "George Carlin rocked the 70's with an unprecedented form of stand-up
comedy involving skits, songs and cutting-edge material." Mathew Schwarz,
George Carlin - A Classic! (visited Oct. 17, 1997)
<http://www.rcknet.com/stuff/docs/stuff/educhsnramshorn/december/enter/
carlin.html>.
74 438 U.S. at 752. "The original seven words were[:] shit, piss, fick, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits." Id.
75 Id.
76 Communications Decency Act of 1996. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
223(a)-(h) ) (amending The Communications Act of 1934, § 223(a)(l)(B),
(a)(2), (d)(1), (d)(1-2)).
' "Broadcasting requires special treatment because of four important
considerations: (1) children have access to radios and in many cases are
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was banned or at least restricted in the broadcasting arena surely
could not be restricted in print. In fact, the Supreme Court knew
this disparity. Do you want to know how the Court knew this?
The Court did not say expressly, however, I feel Justice Stevens
is responsible for appending the full text of the monologue to the
text of the Court's opinion in the U.S. Reports. He was trying to
make a point that I think Mr. McGeady would say underscores
the "in context" language of the CDA. I think it says quite the
opposite because now the Supreme Court opinions are retrievable
on the Internet.
I have this vision that Justice Stevens's niece, if in fact he has a
niece, is corresponding by e-mail. Let us say that he sends his
niece the full text of the Pacifica case with the appended
monologue from George Carlin which has the "seven filthy
words". Now imagine he says, "Honey this was my best case,
read it and grow wise." Here, we have material that is
understood to be offensive because obviously, some people of the
Court were offended.78 It is also understood to have value. It is
not obscene because it does not appeal to the prurient interest. In
fact, no one, as far as I know, has ever listened to a George
Carlin routine and became unwholesomely aroused, which is the
prurient-interest prong of the obscenity test.79 The monologue,
including the seven filthy words routine, was designed to be
offensive. In addition, it was designed to say how absurd it was,
according to George Carlin, that people invested such power in
these words, in this kind of profanity. I do not purport to say
whether he is right or wrong, at least not in this discussion. But
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where
people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
731 n2. (1978).
78 Id. at 750-51 (holding that the commission's imposition of sanctions did
not violate the constitution).
" Id. at 768. "Nevertheless, we have made it abundantly clear that under
any test of obscenity as to minors .. . to be obscene 'such expression must
be, in some significant way, erotic.' " 422 U.S. at 213 n.10 (quoting Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. at 20). Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not
an erotic appeal to the prurient interests of children, the Court, for the first
time, allowed the government to prevent minors from gaining access to
materials that are not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them." Id.
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we do know, that was political speech and if not then what is?
The monologue is political speech at the minimum; but even if
one thinks it is nearly valueless, as Justice Stevens did when he
wrote for the majority, one should ask whether it makes sense to
build your whole society around the assumption that this stuff is
so harmful that we have to keep it out of the public square. The
worst profanity I have ever heard has been in face-to-face
situations. I think that is true for many people. It is recognized
that Americans like to speak frankly to each other. I think that
the notion of nuisance speech is inherently destructive to the
notion of freedom of speech. I do not dispute that speech could be
a component of a particular nuisance. What binds us together as
citizens and as communities is not how we set our standards of
acceptable words or expressions or even a particular philosophy
of what is acceptable. Rather, it is a commitment to a larger
principle which is one of pluralism. We assume that we are
working as an open society that is built on intolerance of a lot of
different philosophies and that metaphilosophy is the
overreaching philosophy to which we all subscribe.
Is there something about the medium that is inherently different
that makes it more of a threat? I feel that most of the people who
believe this are people who are not themselves comfortable with
technology or the Internet. I have to say this puts us in a bad
position in this generation because we ("we" meaning everybody
in the room) are the only generation that will ever be the
transitional generation between the world that never had this
technology and the world that will have grown up with it.
Almost every single argument that one can make for regulation of
content on the Internet can be made for regulation of any mass
medium. For example, Justice Stevens talks about broadcast
content where the content can flood over one's radio or
television.' One can be offended before one even has a chance to
I Id. at 749. "Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder." Id.
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turn it off.8 As Justice Stevens said in Pacifica, if one is a child,
one can double his or her vocabulary in a certain realm of
expression in an instant." That can be done at Walden Books. I
have read pages there I wish I have not read and if one is a
reasonably fast reader or even an average reader, one may be
offended in an instant and that offense cannot be undone.
What the debate underlying the Communications Decency Act
is really about is a lack of faith in our constitutional principles.
We have these guarantees like freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. However, our leaders don't worry about ordinary
citizens using freedom of speech because people usually talk in
small groups or one-on-one. In addition, there is no need to
worry about the New York Times because there is only one New
York Times. Moreover, there are not that many daily
newspapers to worry about either, because there is usually only
one in each city. Therefore, regulation is easier because identity
is easy. Similarly, they do not have to worry about broadcasting
either, because it is a scarce resource and it can be licensed, thus,
keeping people under control. Suddenly, there is this medium --
the Internet -- in which all the scarcity that was used in the past,
either practically or legally to justify regulation is nonexistent.
Every time one adds a node to the Internet, the size is increased.
It is not really the case that one can justify Pacifica-style
regulation on the Internet. What is really at issue here, I think, is
whether we trust each other as citizens with the kind of liberty the
Constitution seems on its face to give us. That liberty, thanks to
the Internet, is an immense amount of power and once given,
anyone has the power to reach millions, at least potentially. I
think the framers of the Constitution and the founders of the
Republic actually thought that citizens could be trusted with this
power. They did not think that there had to be a special class of
printers and publishers who alone had this license from the king.
S Id. "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio
when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is
to run away after the first blow." Id.
82 Id. at 750. "Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary
in an instant." Id.
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They thought that everybody potentially had the power to speak,
either to a small audience or to a large one, and they could be
trusted to use that liberty wisely. That is one reason why I think
the Internet should not be regulated in this way.
I think that we at least have the potential to refuse to hear what
we do not want to hear. If we are offended by speech, and I am
often deeply offended by speech that I will not share here, I think
our argument is largely that we should not refuse to hear
offensive speech but instead respond with moral suasion. We
should set the better example. I think that every government in
the history of the world has opted for shutting people up because
it is easier to do rather than to try and teach by moral example.
Prof. SHAW:
I want to thank both Paul and Mike for certainly what I found
enlightening statements. I cannot believe that their comments got
anyone to the point where they do not have questions they want to
ask at the microphone. While I am waiting for you to come up to
the microphones I will ask one question to both of them. Mike,
with respect to George Carlin's monologue," you made a
comment earlier, that there are far fewer restrictions on print
media or far fewer permissible restrictions on print media than on
broadcasting media. Clearly, one of the issues that will be
arising is how we should treat the Internet. Should we treat it as
primarily a print medium, in which case there will be far fewer
permissible restrictions, or should we treat it as an electronic
medium, rather than a broadcast medium, in which case greater
restrictions would be permissible? I would appreciate comments
from both of you on that issue.
Mr. McGEADY:
Well, it seems to me that we are going to end up with either a
new approach, media specific, that being the Internet, or we will
end up with the broadcasting rationale that this is pervasive. It
' See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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comes into the home, frequently the parents are not available.
You have latchkey kids, and they can get it in somebody else's
home. It cries out for regulation. It is pervasive. It is all over
and you have the same governmental interest in the protection of
children. The Federal Solicitor's office also argued that there is
an additional interest in the education of parents." Many parents
are afraid to go out and buy a computer because they do not want
their kids exposed to this type of material and parents have a
constitutional right to control their children's education. All
these concepts are involved and I do not think we are going to
end up with the print media that would permit indecency. I did
not quite understand whether Mr. Godwin's argument was that
obscenity should also be permitted. If we can prohibit obscenity
not only in print media, but also in broadcasting, what is the
problem with prohibiting indecency on the internet when the
Supreme Court hopefully says that is a proper approach?
Mr. GOD WIN:
For the record, I am co-counsel on ACLU v. Reno,5 and the
staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation has not
challenged the obscenity provisions of the Communications
Decency Act86 which are merely duplicative of existing law.
Individual philosophies of obscenity are not at issue in ACLU v.
Reno87 or, to my knowledge, in any challenge of the
Communications Decency Act, or any clone of that Act that we
see in the state legislature. If it is not about obscenity, what is it
about? Is it always about George Carlin routines? The Supreme
Court gives us very little guidance about what the contours of
indecency are.
Id. at 758.
85 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
86 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Communications Decency Act of 1996, (CDA or
"the Act"), which constitutes Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
signed into law by the President on February 8, 1996. The CDA will be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), (d)(1),(2), as amended, 47
U.S.C.A. section 223(a)(1)(B), (a)(2),(d)(1),(2).
87 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
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It is an unfortunate term of art because it seems to suggest
something about its meaning from the very word; but, in fact,
when Justice Stevens, in one small subsection of his opinion for
the Court, attempted to define "indecency" in a constitutional
category, only two other justices joined him s  There was no
majority of the Court. The Court said that in the context of
broadcasting, the FCC could penalize somebody for not
broadcasting in the public good.Y That is how the Court meant to
be understood; but the Court has not addressed whether so-called.
The Court has expressly avoided that issue. Even in Sable
Communications v. FCC, 90 which is often cited to justify the
notion that you can regulate indecency in some kind of general
way, Justice White, who wrote for the majority, clearly avoids
making that statement.9'
For those of you who are lawyers, law professors, or law
students, reread that passage in which Justice White spoke about
the Ferbe92 and Ginsburg case as leading precedents on the
principle of protecting children from some kinds of contact."
Those cases are not indecency cases. One is an obscenity-as-to-
minors case, and the other is a child pornography case. They
stand for the general proposition that the state has a compelling
interest in the protection of children, which is undisputed in
ACLU v. RenoY In a First Amendment" case where freedom of
speech is involved, it must not merely be the ease that for the
government to prevail there must be a compelling interest.17 It is
I FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9 Id.
I Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communication
Commission, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
91 Id.
I New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
93 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
94 Sable Communications of California, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
91 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Freedom of Speech Clause provides in
pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of
speech." Id.
I United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test was
established in this case. The test provided that a state regulation of conduct
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also true that the measures taken must be narrowly tailored.98
That is the central constitutional doctrine at issue here.
The "community standard" is a national standard in this
context. 9  It seems contradictory to say that; but the FCC
"community standards", which are applied to indecency, have
always been understood to be the community of the broadcasting
audience, which is everybody within range. The Court has never
really taken it any further than that. Probably one of the reasons
the majority of the justices did not join Justice Stevens in his
definition of indecency in Pacifica'I was that they had just bailed
on the whole issue of national standards of acceptable content in
Miller v. California'0' They wanted to get out of national standard
setting and, in effect the CDA is retrofitting another national
standard for an even broader class, more problematic content. I
do not think the Supreme Court will uphold that.
Mr. McGEADY:
I think we should make a distinction when we quote Pacifica. 101
If you read the cases, you will find that a plurality opinion at the
Supreme Court level is precedential and there is no question in
my mind that this three-justice opinion is a plurality opinion and
is the law of the land.
which itself embodied both speech and nonspeech elements to be sufficently
justified if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the supression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id.
98 Id.
99 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test is a three prong
test that inquires (a) whether 'the average person applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. Id. at 39.
"0 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
'1 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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A six-justice plurality is better than the three-justice plurality
because six justices voted the other way.
Mr. McGEADY:
No, they did not vote the other way.
Mr. GOD WIN:
They did not concur.
Mr. McGEADY:
They did not join together and that is the test for a true plurality
opinion, which is precedential.
Mr. GODWIN:
That is a reasonable argument, but not a compelling one.
Mr. SHAW:
We have a question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER:
My question relates to Mr. McGeady's argument about creating
liability on the Internet service providers. Please address what
dangers are involved if the Supreme Court finds that there is no
problem involved with creating a liability in the Internet service.
For instance, Sprint or AT&T, which is providing access across
the Atlantic Ocean, would they then either become liable or
eliminate a site in, let us say Sweden or Finland which is making
indecent material available for display? Is there anything
comparable in the existing medium with respect to that?
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Mr. McGEADY:
There are comparable provisions that exist in State and Federal
law relative to drugs for instance. If you facilitate the sale or
transportation of drugs, you can go to jail for that. The online
companies have the ability to eliminate this material. The ISPs
have the same ability and they are not exercising it. Sprint has an
awful lot of subsidiaries whose output many people would
question right here in the United States. I do not think we have
to go overseas. The answer to the question is that if they
facilitate it, then they should be responsible.
Of course, you have to properly draft the law to afford the
opportunity to eliminate it before they would be held liable. It
would solve a lot of our transborder problems.
Mr. GOD WIN:
I think we can take it a step further. In fact, most of the roads
and highways in this country are used as interstate and national
highways by distribution trucks that carry indecent content like
Playboy and Penthouse to different venues where minors can
retrieve and use them.
Some of them are subscription copies that go to parents' homes
and latchkey kids can pick up copies before their parents get
home and read them. We can stop that. We can actually do it a
little easier because the government already has some ownership
or control over most of the highways and can inspect every truck
that goes by. If we impose that on the states, for example, which
we arguably could do and justify under the commerce laws, then
we would reduce, to some great degree, the amount of indecent
material on paper that found its way into children's hands.
Obviously, I am making a joke. You can tell by the laughter.
You can monitor your kids on the computer. You know when
they are on the computer because there is the blue or red glow in
the kid's bedroom. On the other hand, they can take the paper
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Any medium can be characterized as a terror. Media that carry
ideas and communications can carry frightening ones, ones that
you do not approve of. I can make a philosophical decision not
to review everything; I am not telling you to approve of all
content. I am saying you should treat the content as if it were the
same regardless of the material.
Mr. McGEADY
I think it is absolutely clear that there is no idea so vile that it
cannot be enunciated in any medium. Ideas are absolutely
protected. It is a question of how you enunciate them. Do you
enunciate them in an obscene manner or with broadcasting in an
indecent manner? Would the commerce law accommodate this
type of regulation?
Mr. GOD WIN:
I was speaking generally.
Mr. McGEADY:
Well, do not be so sure that an obsenity law is not on the books
already. There is a section of Title 18t1 which provides that if
the obscene material has traveled in interstate commerce and is
found and sold in a retail store, then there is a responsibility
there. So that law is already in place.
' 18 U.S.C. Section 1466 states in pertinent part:
(a)Whoever knowingly utters any obsene language or distributes any
obsene matter by means of cable television or subscription
services on television, shall be punished by imprisonment for
not more than two years or by a fine in accordance with this
title, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "distribute" means to send,
transmit, retransmit, telecast, broadcast, or cablecast, including
by wire, microwave, or satellite, or to produce or provide
material for such distribution.
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Mr. GOD WIN:
For the budding constitutional lawyers, this is actually quite an
interesting interplay of State and Federal laws. The Federal
statute uses the term "obscene" and yet obscenity, as we know, is
defined in terms of community standards. As a result, you see an
interaction to the application by the federal system standards.
Mr. SHAW:
We have a couple of questions from the e-mails and we are
almost out of time so I'll ask you to comment on each of the
questions briefly. Let me ask them one at a time. The question
is: "Should there be a rating system for material on the Net; if
so, what would be the best method of implementation?"
Mr. GOD WIN:
I think there should be thousands of rating systems. I am very
much for rating systems. I think it is quite handy in a world
where you have so much information, whether you find it useful
or offensive to be able to do some free processing to filter it.
I think we have rating systems in place. Not all of them have
the force of law; but certainly we know that if we are worried
about empowering parents or individuals to make choices or not
to be annoyed or offended, now you can actually choose to only
watch the Disney Channel. This is an example of the rating
systems. When I was a kid, my mom said I could read anything
that had the Newberry Award' sticker on it because that was the
rating system then, or you could apply Good Housekeeping'0 3 or
the Morality in Media '0 standard.
"0 The Newberry Award is an independent rating rating system. Yahoo Alta
Vista Web Pages (visited Nov. 3,1997)<http://av.yahoo.com/bin/query?
p = Newberry +Award+ Sticker&hc =0&hs =0 >.
"05The Good Housekeeping Seal has been a highly recognized statement of
the magazine's renowned Consumer Policy. The policy states that if a product
bearing the seal proves to be defective within two years of purchase, Good
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We do not have any standard. The standard is the law.
Mr. GODWIM
Yes, I know; but not all of us want standards in the law. Some
of us are a little more tolerant. I would like to see your standard
be in the marketplace of ideas. I would like to see how well
everybody really wants to sign up for the standards of Morality in
Media. I think that, in a democratic society we normally allow
moral suasion. We reason with people, we talk with, and prevail
upon people to agree with us. We do not always have to try to
nuke them by having the police come after them.
Mr. McGEADY:
A rating system could be of some help. Of course, that is the
big debate in Congress today and at the FCC level as to what type
of rating system will be on TV videos. Some would like to go
back to the MPA1° rating system. Most people, when polled, say
they do not like that because they do not think that is suitable for
broadcasting. I think that we will end up on broadcasting with a
Housekeeping will replace the product or refund the purchase price. Hearst
Corporation, Vhat's Behind the Good Housekeeping Seal (visited Nov. 03,
1997) <http:// goodhousekeeping.com/gh/ghilghinstrl.htm>.
1o The organization known as Morality in Media, an advocate of freedom of
speech and of the press, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, recognizes
that obscenity is not covered by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. About MIM - Missions, Goals, and
Accomplishments (visited Nov. 03, 1997)<http://pw2.netcom.coml-mimnyc/
ABOUTMIM.HTM>.
1' The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and its international
counterpart, the Motion Picture Association (MPA) serve as the voice and
advocate of the American motion picture, home video and television
industries, domestically through the MPAA and internationally through the
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rating system that has an audio component and says to parents
that this particular video is unsuitable for children because it has
sexual intercourse, for instance. I think that is where we are
going to end up. That type of rating system on the Internet would
also be helpful to parents.
Mr. GOD WIN:
Rating systems, even in the broadcasting arena, are interesting.
You may remember that in the debate over the V chip. President
Clinton mentioned it briefly when he was talking about rating TV
content for violence.
One of the reasons that there was a lot of threatening and no
legislation that opposed the rating system is that it is by no means
clear constitutionally that Congress could impose a content rating
system even in broadcasting in other media. What they did is
threaten, and the hint is that you will have a huge court battle, or
you can put the V chip in. Well, the manufacturers knew what
direction to take.
Mr. McGEADY:
The rating system is going to be mandated by the FCC if the
industry does not come up with it. That, of course, would be
subjected to constitutional challenge. But there are ways of
amending the law before that challenge occurs to protect the
system by requiring that, for instance, the FCC go into court and
establish the indecency or the lack of, following the rating system
in a particular instance. There are other ways of doing it as well.
Mr. GOD WIN:
Let me ask one question of the audience. How many of you
know of someone who has postponed their purchase of a
television until they get that V chip? Raise you hands!
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They did not raise their hands.
Mr. McGEADY:
The ultimate answer is to enforce the law against obscenity and
indecency.
Prof. SHAW:
We have one last question off the e-mail. The question is,
could you comment on the CDA, the potential role it may or may
not play in "the protection of society" while balancing
constitutional freedoms.
Mr. GOD WiN:
There is often a balancing test in dealing with constitutional law
issues. If there is a balancing test, the government usually wins
because a compelling interest is always scary and freedom of
speech is pretty abstract. In general, I do not like the balancing
test approach. I think that there should be some areas that are
more or less fenced off from the government.
At the same time there is a premise underlying this question,
which I do not think is correct. The premise is that freedom of
speech and social needs stand in opposition to each other. I do not
think that is true. In fact, I think our social goods are built on
freedom of speech. Society cannot progress without freedom of
speech and it cannot be strong without freedom of speech.
Mr. McGEADY:
Well, one of our principles of Morality in Media is that the
First Amendment is one of the greatest things that ever happened.
The question is, is this material within the First Amendment? If
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you remember the Roth"°8 case, the Supreme Court in Miller'°9
said that freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, did not
encompass obscene material. So, it is outside the First
Amendment. That is how we approach this problem.
Prof. SHAW:
I would like to make some very brief remarks although we have
run thirty minutes late. I would want to thank all the panelists
who attended. This was tremendously exciting for me personally
to see so much talent assembled here and discussing critical issues
of the day. I would like to thank both Paul and Mike for the
fireworks. They were both restrained, but you could tell the
passion in both their voices and I hope you learned as much from
it as I did. So I thank you both.
I want to also thank the people of the administration and other
faculty at Touro who helped to make this possible. I want to
thank the people at GRIT, the President, Rob Gould who came up
with the idea. Jodi, and the others at GRIT who made this a
reality. Last of all, I would like to thank you, the audience, for
being here. I know it turned out to be longer than you expected
but I hope you feel that you found it worthwhile. I thank you all.
Rob, you're the one who said you wanted to do it annually,
hopefully we'll see you in another year. Thank you very much.
108 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1"9 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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